In this paper, we introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights: these weights regulate their mutual envy in a situation where indivisible goods are allocated to the agents. We propose two variants of envy-freeness up to one item for the weighted setting: in the strong variant, the envy can be eliminated by removing an item from the envied agent's bundle, whereas in the weak variant, envy can be eliminated by either removing an item from the envied agent's bundle or by replicating an item from the envied agent's bundle in the envying agent's bundle. We prove that for additive valuations, a strongly weighted envy-free allocation up to one item always exists and can be efficiently computed by means of a weight-based picking sequence. For two agents, we can also efficiently achieve strong weighted envy-freeness up to one item in conjunction with Pareto optimality using a weighted version of the classic adjusted winner algorithm. In addition, we show that an allocation that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare always satisfies weak weighted envy-freeness up to one item, but may fail to satisfy the strong version of this property.
Introduction
The fair allocation of scarce resources to interested parties is a central issue in economics. A fundamental fairness criterion is envy-freeness, which requires that all agents find their assigned bundle to be the best among all assigned bundles. We address the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents in an (approximately) envy-free manner when the agents have fixed, positive weights that determine their entitlement of the goods.
There are several ways to interpret these weights and associated envy concepts, depending on the problem domain. In some situations, the weights may represent some publicly known and accepted measure of entitlement such as eligibility or merit ; weighted envy-freeness then stipulates that agents think that the welfare they achieve from their bundle (to the welfare they achieve from another's bundle) corresponds to the ratio of their respective eligibility scores. Another possible interpretation is that a weight specifies the objective cost of participation in the resource allocation "game"-no player should find that a strictly higher bang per buck than her own could be obtained by investing or paying as much as any other agent. Alternatively, Benabbou et al. [2018] (and subsequent work by Benabbou et al. [2019] ) study a model where agents represent groups of members/individuals; each member has her own utilities for the items, and the group valuation can be computed from the utilities of its members. In such settings, the size of a group can be considered as its weight; thus, group i has weighted envy towards group j if and only if the average value members of group i derive from their bundle is less than the value held by j according to i's valuation function, averaged over the members of j; in other words, members of group i believe that, according to their own subjective utilities, agents in group j are, on average, better off than they are. In the setting studied by Benabbou et al. [2018] , groups correspond to ethnic groups (namely, the major ethnic groups in Singapore); maintaining provable fairness guarantees amongst the ethnic groups is highly desirable: it is one of the major tenants of Singaporean society.
To conclude, the goal of this work is to extend notions of envy-freeness to the weighted case, and explore their relationship to other important welfare notions, such as Pareto optimality.
Our contributions
In Section 2, we propose two extensions of the popular fairness concept envyfreeness up to one item (EF1) [Lipton et al., 2004 , Budish, 2011 to the weighted setting: (strong) weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1) and weak weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WWEF1). In addition to some negative results, we show in Section 3 that a WEF1 allocation always exists and can be computed efficiently for additive valuation functions using a weight-based picking sequence -this generalizes a well-known result from the unweighted setting. Moreover, for two agents, we show that a weighted variant of the classic adjusted winner protocol allows us to efficiently compute an allocation that is both WEF1 and Pareto optimal. In Section 4, we prove that an allocation with maximum weighted Nash welfare is both Pareto optimal and WWEF1, thereby generalizing an important result of Caragiannis et al. [2016] ; we also show that such an allocation may fail to satisfy WEF1. We conclude in Section 5 with some promising directions on extensions of these ideas to settings with non-additive valuation functions.
Related work
There is a vast literature on fair division of indivisible items; see, e.g., Bouveret et al. [2016] for an overview. The majority of this literature assumes that the agents are symmetric in that they have equal entitlements. Prior work on the fair allocation of indivisible items to asymmetric agents has tackled fairness concepts that are not based on envy. Farhadi et al. [2019] introduce and study weighted maxmin share (WMMS) fairness, a generalization of an earlier fairness notion of Budish [2011] . Aziz et al. [2019a] explore WMMS fairness in the allocation of indivisible chores -items that, in contrast to goods, are valued negatively by the agents -where agents' weights can be interpreted as their shares of the workload. Recently, Aziz et al. [2019b] propose a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an allocation of a pool of goods and chores that satisfies both Pareto optimality and weighted proportionality up to one item (PROP1) for agents with asymmetric weights. Unequal entitlements have also been considered in the context of divisible goods [Zeng, 2000, Cseh and Fleiner, 2018] . Unlike all of these previous works, we focus on fairness concepts based on weighted envy for the indivisible goods scenario.
Model and definitions
Throughout the paper, denote by [r] the set {1, 2, . . . , r} for any positive integer r. We are given a set N = [n] of agents, and a set O = {o 1 , . . . , o m } of items or goods. Subsets of O are referred to as bundles, and each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function v i : 2 O → R ≥0 over bundles; the valuation function for every
An allocation A of the items to the agents is a collection of n disjoint bundles A 1 , . . . , A n such that i∈N A i ⊆ O; the bundle A i is allocated to agent i and v i (A i ) is agent i's realized valuation under A. Given an allocation A, we denote by A 0 the set O\ i∈N A i , and its elements are referred to as withheld items. An allocation A is said to be complete if A 0 = ∅ and incomplete otherwise.
In our asymmetric setting, each agent i ∈ N has a fixed weight w i > 0: these weights regulate how agents value their own allocated bundles relative to those of other agents, and hence bear on the overall (subjective) fairness of an allocation. More precisely, we define the weighted envy of agent i towards agent j under an allocation A as max 0,
wi . An allocation is weighted envy-free (WEF) if no agent has positive weighted envy towards another agent. Weighted envy-freeness reduces to traditional envy-freeness when w i = w, ∀i ∈ N for some positive real constant w. Since a complete envy-free allocation may not always exist (see, e.g., [Bouveret et al., 2016] ), it follows trivially that a complete WEF allocation may not exist in general.
We now state the main definitions of our paper, which are extensions of envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) [Lipton et al., 2004 , Budish, 2011 to the weighted setting.
Definition 2.1. An allocation A is said to be (strongly) weighted envy-free up to one item (WEF1) if for any pair of agents i, j with vi(Ai)
More generally, A is said to be weighted envy-free up to c items (WEFc) for an integer c ≥ 1 if for any pair of agents i, j, there exists a subset S c ⊆ A j of size at most c such that
Definition 2.2. An allocation A is said to be weakly weighted envy-free up to one item (WWEF1) if for any pair of agents i, j with vi(Ai) 
In addition to fairness, we also often want our allocation to satisfy an efficiency criterion. One important such criterion is Pareto optimality. An al-
An allocation is Pareto-optimal (or PO for short) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
A property of an allocation A that is known to have strong guarantees with respect to both fairness and efficiency in the unweighted setting is the Nash welfare, defined as NW(A) i∈N v i (A i ) [Caragiannis et al., 2016] . For our weighted setting, we define a natural extension called weighted Nash welfare:
Since it is possible that the maximum attainable WNW(A) is 0, we define the maximum weighted Nash welfare or MWNW allocation along the lines of Caragiannis et al. [2016] as follows: given a problem instance, we find a maximal subset of agents, say N max ⊆ N , to which we can allocate bundles of positive value, and compute an allocation to agents in N max that
To see why the notion of MWNW makes some intuitive sense, consider a setting where agents have a value of 1 for each item they receive; furthermore, assume that the number of items is exactly n i=1 w i . In this case, one can verify (using standard calculus) that an allocation maximizing MWNW assigns agent i exactly w i items. Indeed, following the interpretation of w i as the number of members of group i, the expression v i (A i ) wi can be thought of as each member of group i deriving the same value from the set A i ; the group's overall Nash welfare is thus v i (A i ) wi .
Discussion of weak weighted envy
The criterion WEF1 can be criticized as being too demanding in certain circumstances, when the weight of the envied agent is much larger than that of the envying agent. To illustrate this, consider a problem instance where agent 1 has an additive valuation function and is indifferent among all items taken individually, e.g., v 1 (o) = 1 for every o ∈ O. Now, if w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 100, then eliminating one item from agent 2's bundle reduces agent 1's weighted valuation of this bundle by merely 0.01. As such, we might trigger a substantial adverse effect on the welfare/efficiency of the allocation by aiming to (approximately) eliminate 1's weighted envy towards 2. This line of thinking was our motivation for introducing the weak weighted envy-freeness concept.
The WWEF1 property turns out to have the following interesting interpretation for additive valuations. Let us call an agent with a higher (resp., lower) weight a bigger (resp., smaller ) agent. If w i ≥ w j , then the WWEF1 property for agents i and j reduces to having vi(Ai)
for some o ∈ A j , which is identical to the (strong) WEF1 condition -a bigger agent is weakly weighted envy-free up to one item towards a smaller agent if the latter's bundle has an item which can be eliminated to make the bigger agent prefer (in terms of weightadjusted valuation) her own allocated bundle to the smaller agent's reduced bundle. If w i < w j , then the WWEF1 property requires vi(Ai)
for some o ∈ A j -a smaller agent is weakly weighted envy-free up to one item towards a bigger agent if the latter's bundle has an item such that augmenting the smaller agent's bundle with (a replica of) this item makes her prefer (again, in a weight-adjusted manner) this augmented bundle to the bigger agent's original bundle.
Both of the above statements can be viewed as stronger versions along different lines of what we can call transfer weighted envy-freeness: agent i is transfer weighted envy-free up to one item towards agent j under the allocation A if there is an item o ∈ A j which would eliminate the weighted envy of i towards j upon being transferred from
. The first and second conditions in the previous paragraph relax transfer to elimination from A j only and replication in A i only, respectively.
WEF1 allocations
Although it is known that for arbitrary monotone valuation functions, a complete (unweighted) EF1 allocation always exists and can be efficiently computed assuming polynomial-time oracle access to the valuation functions [Lipton et al., 2004] , this fact does not imply the existence of the more general complete WEF1 allocations for arbitrary weights and valuation functions.
As far as envy in the traditional sense is concerned, what an agent actually "envies" is an allocated bundle regardless of who owns that bundle. However, both the subjective valuations of allocated bundles and the relative weights interact in non-trivial ways to decide weighted envy. It is easy to see that weighted envy of i towards j does not imply (traditional) envy of i towards j, and vice versa. A crucial implication is that even if agent i's bundle is replaced with the bundle of an agent j towards whom i has weighted envy, i's realized valuation (and hence the ratio of its realized valuation to its weight) may decrease as a result. Indeed, consider a problem instance with N = [2], O = {o 1 , o 2 , o 3 }; weights w 1 = 3 and w 2 = 1; and identical, additive valuation functions such that v i (o) = 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀o ∈ O. Under the complete allocation with A 1 = {o 1 , o 2 }, agent 1 has weighted envy towards agent 2 since v 1 (A 2 )/w 2 = 1/1 = 1 > 2/3 = v 1 (A 1 )/w 1 , although agent 1 would not prefer to replace A 1 with A 2 since that reduces her realized valuation from 2 to 1. On the other hand, agent 2 could benefit from replacing A 2 with A 1 even though she does not have weighted envy towards agent 1. As such, the natural extension of Lipton et al. [2004] 's seminal envy cycle elimination algorithm does not guarantee a complete WEF1 allocation except in special cases. One such special case is when the agents all have identical valuations.
Proposition 3.1. The weighted version of Lipton et al. [2004] 's envy cycle elimination algorithm (where an edge exists from agent i to agent j if and only if i has weighted envy towards j) produces a complete WEF1 allocation whenever
Proof. From the construction of the algorithm [Lipton et al., 2004] , it is evident that the (partial) allocation at the end of each iteration is guaranteed to be WEF1 as long as we can find an agent, say i, towards whom no other agent has weighted envy at the beginning of the iteration: we give the item under consideration to this agent i and thus any resulting weighted envy towards i can be eliminated by removing this item. The only way we would not find such an agent is if the weighted envy graph consisted of cycles only; we will show that this cannot be the case. Suppose that agents 1, 2, . . . , m form a cycle (in that order) for some m ∈ [n]. Then, under identical valuations, we
which is a contradiction. Hence, the weighted envy graph can never have cycles, ensuring there is always an agent we can give an item to, while maintaining the WEF1 property.
Unfortunately, the positive results for utilizing Lipton et al. [2004] end in Proposition 3.1. Lipton et al. [2004] 's envy cycle elimination algorithm may not produce a complete WEF1 allocation, even in a problem instance with two agents having additive valuations.
Proposition 3.2. If agents do not have identical valuation functions, then the weighted version of
Proof. Consider a problem instance with N = [2] and m = 12; weights w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 2; and valuation functions such that:
for r = 1; 0.4 for r = 12; 0.21 otherwise;
Suppose that the weighted envy cycle elimination algorithm iterates over o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o 12 , and starts by allocating o 1 to agent 1 due to, say, lexicographic tie-breaking. At this point, agent 2 has weighted envy towards agent 1 and not vice versa; moreover, this condition persists until items o 2 , . . . , o 10 have all been allocated to agent 2. At this point, item o 11 also goes to agent 2, resulting in valuations
Agent 2 still has weighted envy towards agent 1 since v 2 (A 2 )/w 2 = 2/2 = 1 < 1.1/1 = v 2 (A 1 )/w 1 ; on the other hand, agent 1 also develops weighted envy towards agent 2 since v 1 (A 2 )/w 2 = (0.21 × 10)/2 = 1.05 > 1 = v 1 (A 1 )/w 1 . Thus, there is a cycle in the induced envy graph. For an unweighted envy graph, we would "de-cycle" the graph at this point by swapping bundles over the cycle and that would still maintain the invariant that the allocation is EF1. However, if we swap bundles in this example, agent 2 will end up having weighted envy up to more than one item towards agent 1 since v 2 (A 1 )/w 2 = 1.1/2 = 0.55 and v 2 (A 2 \{o})/w 1 = (0.2 × 9)/1 = 1.8 for every o ∈ A 2 . 1 Interestingly, in this example the allocation up to o 11 is actually WEF1 without swapping. However, the approach inspired by [Lipton et al., 2004] cannot even proceed to o 12 . 2
WEF1 and PO Allocations for Two Agents via the Adjusted Winner Protocol
We now show that for two agents with additive valuations, we can achieve both WEF1 and PO by adapting the classic adjusted winner protocol to the weighted setting. We first address instances where v 1 (o) > 0 and v 2 (o) > 0 for every o ∈ O, and then comment on what happens otherwise.
Theorem 3.3. For two agents with additive valuations and arbitrary positive real weights, a complete, WEF1 and PO allocation always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume first that both agents have positive value for all items. Our proof is constructive: we claim that the Weighted Adjusted Winner algorithm as delineated in Algorithm 1 produces an allocation satisfying the theorem statement. First note that the left-hand side of the while loop condition is strictly increasing in d and trivially exceeds the right-hand side for d = m − 1; 3 hence, there always exists a d ∈ [m − 1] which satisfies the stop criterion and the loop terminates at the smallest such d.
1 In fact, the weighted envy is up to eight items. 2 Another interesting feature of this example is that the two agents have commensurable valuations:
o∈O v 1 (o) = o∈O v 2 (o) = 3.5. 3 For d ≥ m − 1, we set the right-hand side to zero. , which implies that agent 1 is weighted envy-free towards agent 2 up to one item (specifically this item o d * +1 ).
Algorithm 1: Weighted Adjusted Winner
On the other hand, by construction, we also get that
Moreover, due to the ordering of the ratios, we have
Combining with Inequality (1), dividing through by v1(o * ) v2(o * ) , and simplifying, we get
Thus, agent 2 is also weighted envy-free towards agent 1 up to one item (specifically o * ).
Pareto optimality: First note that no incomplete allocation can be Pareto optimal since the realized valuation of either agent could be strictly improved by augmenting its bundle with a withheld item (under our assumption that each agent values each item positively). Since the allocation A produced by Algorithm 1 is complete, it suffices to show that it cannot be Pareto dominated by an alternative complete allocation A ′ . Any such complete allocation can be thought of as being generated by transferring items between A 1 and A 2 .
As such, we will assume that A ′ 2 ∩ A 1 = ∅. Then, due to the ratio ordering and how A 1 , A 2 are constructed,
.
Combining with Inequality 2, we get
which contradicts the necessary condition for A ′ to Pareto dominate A: v 2 (A ′ 2 ) ≥ v 2 (A 2 ). Assuming v 2 (A ′ 2 ) > v 2 (A 2 ) leads us to an analogous contradiction. Hence, A must be Pareto optimal.
Complexity:
The m ratios can be sorted in O(m log m) time. The while loop condition can be checked in O(1) time, so the total time taken by the while loop is O(m). Hence, the algorithm runs in O(m log m) time.
Let us now address the scenario where there are items that are of zero value to an agent. Of course, items valued at zero by both agents can be safely assumed away. We will initialize the bundle A i with items valued positively by agent i ∈ {1, 2} only, i.e., A 0
Then we run Algorithm 1 on the remaining items and use its output (A 1 , A 2 ) to augment the respective bundles. We will now show that the resulting allocation (A 0 1 ∪ A 1 , A 0 2 ∪ A 2 ) is WEF1 and PO. By the construction of the algorithm, there is an o
since valuations are additive and v 1 (A 0 2 ) = 0. Thus, agent 1 is weighted envy-free towards agent 2 up to one item; the converse is also true by similar arguments.
Since a Pareto optimal allocation cannot be incomplete, it suffices to show that the (complete) allocation under consideration is not Pareto dominated by any complete allocation. Again, any complete allocation can be obtained from (A 0 1 ∪ A 1 , A 0 2 ∪ A 2 ) by swapping items between agents. It is evident that any allocation in which an item o ∈ A 0 1 (resp., an item o ∈ A 0 2 ) belongs to agent 2 (resp., agent 1) is Pareto dominated by the allocation wherein this item is given to agent 1 (resp., agent 2), everything else remaining the same. Hence, it suffices to show that a Pareto improvement cannot be achieved by swapping items in A 1 ∪ A 2 between the agents -but we already know this from the earlier part of the proof.
Picking Sequence Protocols for WEF1 Allocations with n ≥ 2 Agents
When all agents have equal weight, it is well-known that a round-robin algorithm, wherein the agents take turns picking an item, produces an EF1 allocation (see, e.g., Caragiannis et al. [2016] ). We show next that in the general case we can construct a weight-dependent picking sequence, which guarantees WEF1 for any number of agents and arbitrary weights.
Theorem 3.4. For any number n ≥ 2 of agents with additive valuations and arbitrary positive real weights, a complete WEF1 allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. 
end
Proof. Our proof is constructive: we construct a picking sequence such that at each turn, an agent with the lowest weight-adjusted picking frequency picks the next item (Algorithm 2). We claim that after the allocation of each item, for any agent i, every other agent is weighted envy-free towards i up to the item that i picked first.
To this end, first note that picking the agent who has had the minimum (weight-adjusted) number of picks thus far ensures that the first n picks are a round robin over the agents; in this phase, the allocation is obviously WEF1 since each agent has at most one item at any point. We will show that, after this phase, the algorithm generates a picking sequence over the agents with the following property:
Lemma 3.5. Consider an agent i chosen by Algorithm 2 to pick an item at some iteration t, and suppose that this is not her first pick. Let t i and t j be the numbers of times agent i and some other agent j appear in the prefix of iteration t in the sequence respectively, not including iteration t itself. Then tj ti ≥ wj wi . We will then show that this property is sufficient to ensure that the latest picker does not attract weighted envy up to more than one item towards herself after her latest pick:
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that, for every iteration in which agent i receives an item after her first pick, the numbers of times that agent i and some other agent j appear in the prefix of the iteration in the sequence-t i and t j respectivelysatisfy the relation tj ti ≥ wj wi . Then, in the partial allocation up to and including i's latest pick, agent j is weighted envy-free towards i up to the first item i picked.
Obviously, after its latest picking, an agent's envy towards others cannot get any worse. Since the partial allocation after the initial, round-robin phase is WEF1 and every agent is weighted envy-free up to one item towards every picker due to Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, the allocation is WEF1 at every iteration. Hence, for the proof of correctness, it suffices to prove the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Since agent i is picked at iteration t, it must be the case that i ∈ arg min k∈N t k w k . This means that ti wi ≤ tj wj , i.e., tj ti ≥ wj wi since t i > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Let γ wj wi . Consider any iteration t in which agent i is chosen. Let agent j's values for the items allocated to agent i in the latter's second, third, . . . , (t i + 1) st picks (the last one occurring at the iteration t under consideration) be β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β ti respectively. If o * is the first item picked by agent i and A t the partial allocation up to and including iteration t, then clearly v j (A t i \{o * }) = ti x=1 β x . Let the number of times agent j appears in the prefix of agent i's second pick be τ 1 ; that between agent i's second and third picks be τ 2 ; . . . ; that between agent i's t th i and (t i + 1) st picks be τ ti . Let agent j's values for the items she herself picked during phase
τx y=1 α x y . Now, since r x=1 τ x and r are the numbers of times agents j and i appear in the prefix of the latter's (r + 1) st pick respectively, the condition of the lemma dictates that r x=1 τ x ≥ rγ ∀r ∈ [t i ].
(3)
Note that τ i ≥ γ > 0; but τ x can be zero for some x ∈ {2, 3, . . . , t i } -this corresponds to the scenario that agent i picked more than once successively. Moreover, every time agent j was chosen, she picked one of the items she values the most among those available, including the items picked by agent i later. Hence, if τ x > 0, then
Note that Inequality (4) holds trivially if τ x = 0 since both sides are zero; hence it holds for every x ∈ [t i ]. We claim that for each r
To prove the claim, we proceed by induction on r. For the base case r = 1, we have τ 1 > 0. Hence, from Inequality (4),
where we use τ 1 − γ ≥ 0 due to Inequality (3). For the inductive step, assume that the claim holds for r − 1; we will prove it for r. If τ r > 0, We have
where the first inequality follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the second from Inequality (4), and the third from Inequality (3) as well as the fact that max{β r−1 , β r , . . . , β ti } ≥ max{β r , β r+1 , . . . , β ti }. This proves the claim. Now, taking r = t i in the claim, we get
where we use Inequality (3) again for the second inequality. This implies that v j (A t j ) ≥ wj wi · v j (A t i \{o * }), i.e., agent j is weighted envy-free towards agent i up to one item, concluding the proof.
For the time-complexity, note that there are O(m) iterations of the while loop. In each iteration, determining the next picker takes O(n) time, while letting the picker pick her favorite item takes O(m) time. Since we may assume that m > n (otherwise it suffices to allocate at most one item to every agent), the algorithm runs in time O(m 2 ).
If w i = w, a positive constant for every i ∈ N , then Algorithm 2 degenerates into the traditional round-robin procedure which is guaranteed to return an EF1 allocation for additive valuations, but may not be PO; as such, Algorithm 2 may not produce a PO allocation either. This is easily seen in the following example:
With lexicographic tie-breaking for both agents and items, our algorithm will give us A 1 = o 1 and A 2 = o 2 , which is Pareto dominated by A ′ 1 = {o 2 } and A ′ 2 = {o 1 }.
WWEF1 allocations
In this section, we show that the MWNW allocation satisfies WWEF1 and PO, thereby generalizing Caragiannis et al. [2016] 's result from the unweighted setting. We also show that for any constant c, this allocation may fail to be WEFc.
Theorem 4.1. For any number n of agents with additive valuations and arbitrary positive real weights, the MWNW allocation is always WWEF1 and Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let A be a MWNW allocation, with N max being the subset of agents having strictly positive realized valuations under A. If it were not PO, there would exist an allocationÂ such that v i (Â i ) > v i (A i ) for some i ∈ N and v j (Â j ) ≥ v j (A j ) for every j ∈ N \{i}. If i ∈ N \N max , we would have v j (Â j ) > 0 for every j ∈ N max ∪ {i}, which contradicts the assumption that N max is a largest subset of agents to which it is possible to give positive valuations simultaneously. If i ∈ N max , then j∈Nmax v j (Â j ) wj > j∈Nmax v j (A j ) wj , which violates the optimality of the right-hand side. This proves that A is PO. As in Caragiannis et al. [2016] , we will start by proving that A is WWEF1 for the scenario N max = N and then address the case N max = N . Assume that N max = N . If A is not WWEF1, then there exists a pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that i has weak weighted envy towards j up to more than one item. Clearly, there must be at least two items in j's bundle that i values positively. Moreover, j must value these items positively as well-otherwise we can transfer them to i and obtain a Pareto improvement.
Let
We construct another allocation A ′ by transferring an item o * from j to i so that A ′ i = A i ∪ {o * }, A ′ j = A j \{o * }, and A ′ r = A r ∀r ∈ N \{i, j}. We have
First, note that v j (o) > 0, ∀o ∈ A i j , otherwise the above ratio for o * with v j (o * ) = 0 equals 1 + vi(o * ) vi(Ai) wi > 1, contradicting the assumption that A is a MWNW allocation. However, even under this condition, we will show that if agents i, j violated the WWEF1 property, the above ratio would still exceed 1 for some item o * .
vi(o) specifically to transfer from i to j for changing the allocation from A to A ′ . This is well-defined by the definition of A i j . Consider
from Bernoulli's inequality, since vi(o * ) vi(Ai) > 0 and wi wj ≥ 1. As in Caragiannis et al. [2016] , simple algebra shows that
This is true under our assumptions for the following reasons. Since the "bigger" agent i has weak weighted envy towards the "smaller" agent j up to more than one item, vi(Ai)
into the above strict inequality and simplifying, we obtain (5). But chaining all these inequalities together, we get
This is a contradiction.
Case II w i < w j . As in Case I, we pick an item o * ∈ arg min o∈A i j vj (o) vi(o) ; this also means that o * ∈ arg max o∈A i
Here, 1 + vi(o * ) vi(Ai) > 0 obviously, and 
Since the smaller agent i has weak weighted envy towards the bigger agent j up to more than one item, vi(Ai)+vi(o * ) wi < vi(Aj ) wj ; also, due to our choice of o * ,
· v j (A j ) into the above strict inequality, we verify (6), and chaining all inequalities as before leads us to the same contradiction: WNW(A ′ ) > WNW(A).
This completes the proof for the scenario N max = N . The rest of the proof mirrors the corresponding part of the proof of Caragiannis et al. [2016] 's Theorem 3.2. If N max N , it is easy to see that there can be no (weighted) envy towards any i ∈ N max since v j (A i ) = 0 for any such i and every j ∈ N . Also, for any i, j ∈ N max , we can show exactly as in the proof for N max = N above that there cannot be weighted envy up to more than one item. Suppose for contradiction that an agent i ∈ N \N max is not (weakly) weighted envy-free towards some j ∈ N max up to one item under A. This means that i still has positive value for j's bundle even after removing any single item; in particular, i values at least two items in A j positively. Since j must also value these items positively, we may transfer one of them to i and keep both i and j's valuations positive. This contradicts the maximality of N max . Hence, in all cases, i ∈ N \N max must be weakly weighted envy-free up to one item towards j ∈ N max .
We now show that the MWNW allocation may fail to be WEF1. In fact, we show the stronger statement that for any fixed c, the allocation may fail to be WEFc.
Proposition 4.2. Let c be an arbitrary positive integer. There exists a problem instance with two agents having identical additive valuations for which the MWNW allocation is not WEFc.
. . , o k+c+2 }; the weights are w 1 = 1 and w 2 = k for some integer k such that (1 + 1 k+c ) k > 2 (such a k exists because lim k→∞ (1 + 1 k+c ) k = e); the agents have identical, additive valuations defined by v i (o) = 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀o ∈ O. Since (1 + 1 k+c ) k > 2, we have 1 · (k + c + 1) k > 2 · (k + c) k . Moreover, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k + c, we have (1 + 1 k+c+1−i ) k > (1 + 1 k+c ) k > 2 > i+1 i , and so i(k + c + 2 − i) k > (i + 1)(k + c + 1 − i) k . This means that any MWNW allocation A must give one item to agent 1, say A 1 = {o 1 }, and the remaining items to agent 2, i.e., A 2 = {o 2 , . . . , o k+c+2 }. However, even if we remove a set S c of at most c items from A 2 , we would still have v 1 (A 2 \S c )/w 2 ≥ 1 + 1/k > 1 = v 1 (A 1 )/w 1 , so the allocation is not WEFc.
Beyond additivity
We conclude the paper with a discussion on the difficulty of extending weighted envy concepts beyond additive valuations. First, we show that even for simple non-additive valuations, the existence of a WEF1 or WWEF1 allocation can no longer be guaranteed.
Proposition 5.1. Even if n = 2, one of the agents has a submodular, monotone, normalized valuation, while the other agent has an additive valuation, a complete WWEF1 allocation (or a complete WEF1 allocation) may not exist.
Proof. Suppose N = [2]; w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 2; m > 5; the valuation functions are: v 1 (S) = |S| and v 2 (S) = 1 for every S ∈ 2 O \∅, v 1 (∅) = v 2 (∅) = 0. The functions are obviously normalized and monotone; v 2 (·) is additive and v 2 (·) is submodular (agent 2 is indifferent among all non-empty bundles). Note that for any allocated bundles A 1 and A 2 such that |A 1 | ≥ 2 and A 2 is non-empty, v 2 (A 2 )/w 2 = 1/2 but v 2 (A 1 \{o})/w 1 = 1 > v 2 (A 2 )/w 2 for every o ∈ A 1 , and v 2 (A 2 ∪ {o})/w 2 = 1/2 < v 2 (A 1 )/w 1 for every o ∈ A 1 . Thus, the only way to make agent 2 (weakly) weighted envy-free up to one item towards agent 1 is to ensure that |A 1 | ≤ 1. Assume without loss of generality that A 1 = {o 1 } (if A 1 = ∅, agent 1 will be even worse off in the argument that follows). To make the allocation complete, we must have A 2 = O\{o 1 }, so that v 1 (A 1 ) = 1 and v 1 (A 2 ) = |A 2 | = m − 1. Since agent 1 has an additive valuation and a smaller weight than agent 2, she would be weakly weighted envy-free up to one item towards agent 2 if and only if there is an item o ∈ A 2 such that v 1 (A 1 ∪ {o})/w 1 ≥ v 1 (A 2 )/w 2 = (m − 1)/2 > 2, since m > 5. However, for any o ∈ A 2 , we have v 1 (A 1 ∪ {o})/w 1 = v 1 ({o 1 , o}) = 2. Hence the allocation cannot be WWEF1.
One of the key ideas in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is what we can call the transferability property: if agent i has (weighted) envy towards agent j under additive valuations, then there is at least one item o in j's bundle for which agent i has positive (marginal) utility, i.e., the item o could be transferred from j to i to augment i's realized valuation. Unfortunately, this property no longer holds for non-additive valuations.
Proposition 5.2. Even if an agent i with a non-additive valuation function has weighted envy towards agent j under allocation A, there may be no item in j's bundle for which i has positive marginal utility, i.e., ∃o ∈ A j s.t.
Proof. Consider the example in Proposition 5.1. Under any allocation with |A 1 | = m − 1 and |A 2 | = 1, agent 2 has weighted envy towards agent 1 since v 2 (A 2 ) = 1/2 < 1 = v 2 (A 1 )/w 1 ; but v 2 (A 2 ∪ {o}) = 1 = v 2 (A 2 ) for every o ∈ A 1 .
